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ABSTRACT 
The growth of renewable generation (and wind 
generation in particular) in distribution networks has 
led to the development of Active Network Management 
(ANM) systems which aim to increase the capacity of 
renewable and distributed generation (DG) that can 
connect to distribution networks.  One such strategy is 
generation curtailment where DG is given a non-firm 
connection under which the network operator instructs 
the DG unit to reduce its power output under specified 
conditions and this is practically achieved through the 
implementation of automatic control in the ANM 
scheme. The rules which define the order of curtailment 
are often referred to as Principles of Access (PoA).  
   
This paper presents a number of PoA, and using an 
Optimal Power Flow (OPF) method of analysis, the 
impact of different PoA and the capacity factors of wind 
generators are compared. 
When looking at non-market arrangements; compared 
with Last In First Off (LIFO), Pro Rata and Rota offer 
an improved capacity factor for the majority of DG 
connected in lower priority positions. Market 
arrangements, conversely, lead to the DG having 
increased control over whether to participate in 
curtailment markets and the opportunity to increase 
revenue. However these arrangements would require a 
significant change in the way in which distribution 
networks operate.  
INTRODUCTION 
In the UK there are several Active ANM schemes which 
are currently operating, or plan to operate a curtailment 
scheme for wind powered and other renewable 
generators [1]–[4]. The rules which define the method 
of curtailment are often referred to as Principles of 
Access (PoA).  
 
PoA for ANM enabled generators has been identified as 
an area of serious concern for generators, distribution 
network operators (DNOs) and other 
stakeholders. Questions exist in the underlying 
philosophies for PoA, the design of PoA mechanisms 
and the implications of alternative PoA for DG, network 
operators and consumers.   
 
There are a number of alternative PoA which have yet 
to be explored or trialed. The authors have selected five 
PoA for assessment, and a qualitative and quantitative 
analysis is provided. An Optimal Power Flow (OPF) 
method is used to assess the impact of different 
curtailment strategies on wind generation connected to 
an ANM scheme and the capacity factor (CF) of each 
generator is compared against a base case.  
OVERVIEW OF PRINCIPLES OF ACCESS 
There have been a number of initial discussion papers 
surrounding PoA [5]–[7].  In this paper, PoA are 
grouped into Non-Market and Market Arrangements to 
highlight the level of control which the System Operator 
and curtailable generation i.e. non-firm generators 
(NFG) have over curtailment levels.   
 
Non-market Arrangements 
Non-market arrangements use predetermined rules to 
curtail NFG. These rules are decided by the DNO and 
NFG must adhere to these rules in order to connect to 
the network. Non-market arrangements are simpler 
when compared with market arrangements for the DNO 
to implement as no changes to current rules and 
regulations are required.   
 
Last In First Out (LIFO) 
Under this method, the first NFG to be curtailed under a 
constraint event is the chronologically last NFG to 
request a connection to the network or added to an 
active network management (ANM) scheme.  Adding a 
new NFG connection to the LIFO priority list (in the 
position of least priority) does not alter the priority 
position of existing NFG. This approach is consistent, 
transparent and easy to implement within the current 
UK regulations. However, this method would not 
necessarily be the best way of fully utilising the 
available network capacity or the available renewable 
generation. For example, the lowest priority generator 
may be located furthest from the constraint which would 
result in a higher volume of curtailment required when 
compared with a generator located closer to the point of 
congestion.  As the number of NFG increases, the CF 
for those at the bottom of the priority list may begin to 
approach unacceptable levels, and discourage any new 
NFG connections. 
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Pro Rata 
The Pro Rata method divides the required curtailment 
equally between all NFG contributing to a network 
constraint.  The total amount of curtailment would be 
shared by each of the NFG based on the ratio of rated or 
actual NFG output to total required curtailment. 
Implementing this method would grant equitable access 
for multiple NFG. However, it is difficult for the DNO 
to calculate the long term volumes of curtailment of this 
method since, as more NFG is connected, the level of 
curtailment of each NFG, including those already 
connected with NFG contracts, will increase. To some 
extent, this can be solved by setting a cap on the level of 
generation which can be connected to a particular 
network location without the network being reinforced. 
This then gives a minimum CF which allows generators 
to calculate return on investment.  
 
Rota 
This method curtails NFG based on the order specified 
in a predetermined rota. This rota could be changed on a 
daily, weekly or monthly basis using the network 
operator’s discretion. As the number of generators 
connected under a Rota arrangement increases, the level 
of curtailment may increase however the length of time 
spent at the bottom of the priority stack would decrease. 
This uncertainty could be eased if the DNO were to set 
a cap on the amount of generation that can connect to 
the network, thus calculating a minimum CF that each 
NFG might experience however uncertainty regarding 
the organisation of the rota could still impact on 
generation investment decisions.  
Market Arrangements 
Under a market arrangement generators may submit 
bids to indicate their willingness to be curtailed, and the 
system operator would curtail the generators who bid in 
at the lowest cost to the network.  
These arrangements would not impact on existing 
connections (assuming they have a firm connection and 
their rights are ‘grandfathered’) and, in principle, would 
be sustainable for future network developments. In 
addition, there is potential to extend the market to 
existing firm connected generators should they choose 
to participate. 
These approaches will require the largest change from 
existing practice in distribution networks, and require 
the development of market rules and structure under 
which the generators could operate. This will require a 
large input from all bodies involved – generators, SO’s, 




In a pay-as-bid market, generators are paid the price 
they have bid for curtailment of energy. This gives 
control of curtailment to the generator and allows them 
to indicate their willingness to curtail through the bid 
price. It also ensures that generators are certain the price 
in which they will be paid, should curtailment be 
requested of them. This leaves little control in hands of 
the market operator to influence curtailment prices, and 
bids may not necessarily reflect the true cost of lost 
energy to wind generators.  
Curtailment Market Clearing Price (CMCP) 
In this arrangement, compensation for curtailment is 
based on the system price. Generators submit individual 
bids, and the market operator would determine the price 
generators are paid for curtailment depending on the 
price at which the curtailment was cleared. This is the 
system adopted by National Grid as GB System 
Operator for determining the System Buy/Sell Price. It 
ensures efficient market operation and encourages 
generators to enter bids which reflect true profit loss.  
MODELLING METHOD 
In order to analyze the impact of different PoA on wind 
capacity factors, this paper will use an OPF method to 
curtail non-firm wind generation, using generator cost 
functions and solve the network according to other 
network constraints such as voltage and thermal limits. 
This method has been used previously by Dolan et al 
[8]. Details of the modelling method are explained in 
the following section.  
OPF Problem Formulation 
The OPF method works by using generator costs to 
control the order in which they are curtailed. By using 
this method the OPF ensures network operation within 
limits at all times. The costs of the NFG are set at a 
level which informs the OPF algorithm the order in 
which to curtail them and so different PoA can be 
implemented within the OPF. Depending on the location 
of the constraint, the OPF will determine which 
generators are contributing to the constraint and curtail 
in the appropriate order.  
 
OPF Formulation 









 (1)  
 
Subject to  
𝑙 <  𝐴[𝑥] < 𝑢  (2) 














  (3) 
 
Polynominal cost functions were used to apply 
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curtailment to NFG. The function takes the form: 
 
𝑓(𝑝) = 𝑐𝑛𝑝
𝑛 + ⋯+ 𝑐1𝑝 + 𝑐0   (4) 
 
Where n=3 was chosen for all generators.  
 
Additional constraints are added to the OPF formulation 
for the Pro Rata arrangement to ensure that the NFG 
output is related to other generators behind the same 
constraint.  
 
Market Bid Logic 
For market arrangements, the bids or costs associated 
with each generator will change every 24hrs. In order to 
inform this change, simple logic controls are used to 
inform the generator whether to increase, decrease or 
hold the same bid based on actions in the previous time 
step. The bids are based on the profit which generators 
would expect to make without any curtailment i.e. 
£/MWh received from the sale of electricity and the 
allocation of ROCs/FITs 
 
The basic principles of calculating the curtailment 
clearing price are shown in Figure 1 below.  
 
 
Figure 1 Diagram of System Price market 
RESULTS 
The POA were modelled on the Orkney distribution 
network and results shown are based on one year of 
demand and generation data. The following results 
demonstrate the impact of different POA on the CF of 
NFG. All generators are located behind a single 
constraint.  
 
The results in Figure 2 demonstrate the change in 
capacity factor of non-market arrangements when 
moving away from LIFO. Generators A and B receive 
no curtailment under LIFO, and therefore experience the 
largest negative change in capacity factor when moving 
to any of the other non-market arrangements. Similarly, 
generators F-K experience the largest positive changes 
in capacity factor as they experience the majority of 
curtailment under LIFO.  
 
Figure 2 Change in average annual capacity factor for 
non-market arrangements compared against LIFO base 
case.  
In Figure 3 the CF of all non-market arrangements are 
shown. The Rota arrangement provides a relatively even 
distribution of curtailment across all NFG when 
compared with other non-market arrangements. The 
Rota arrangement results in an increase of average CF 
to 0.29 compared with 0.25 under LIFO, and 0.22 under 
Pro Rata.  
 
 
Figure 3 Generator average annual capacity factors under 
non-market arrangements  
In Figure 4, the average annual CF of the market 
arrangements is compared to the LIFO base case. The 
results are for one run of bid simulations. The results of 
the market could change should generators decide on 
different bid strategies. Generators with high pre-
curtailment profits, B, C, D and H have higher capacity 
factors due to higher bid levels. All generators in this 
simulation are wind and therefore there is a small 
variability in costs between turbines. In a more varied 
market the results could vary significantly as 
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Figure 4 Generator average annual capacity factors under 
Market arrangements compared to LIFO 
EXPERIENCE OF NETWORK OPERATORS 
Currently in the UK, non-market arrangements are the 
PoA of choice. They do not require any changes to 
regulatory framework and experience has shown that 
generators are prepared to accept an ongoing cost of 
curtailment (based on a suitable minimal CF) in 
exchange for a lower upfront capital cost of connection. 
While simple in concept, non-market arrangements can 
be complex to implement e.g. rota arrangement would 
require the creation of a rotating curtailment order in the 
ANM logic controllers. 
Market arrangements represent a significant leap in 
terms of network operation for DNOs, and there is 
currently no trials using market arrangements for energy 
movements in their networks. However national System 
Operators uses markets to balance transmission systems 
and methods could be adopted, and adapted from 
transmission to apply at distribution level.  
The introduction of Demand Side Response and Energy 
Storage solutions may lead the way to market trading at 
distribution level. Already on Orkney, a 2MW storage 
battery operates under a commercial contract to help 
balance the distribution network and minimise 
curtailment of renewable sources. [9] 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has presented a number of PoA which can be 
applied to non-firm generators connected to ANM 
schemes.  
The results demonstrate that moving away from LIFO 
PoA can, in the majority of cases, result in a smaller 
range of capacity factors across the non-firm generators 
behind a single constraint. 
Non-market (administered) arrangements are simple to 
implement and transparent.  Adopting alternatives to 
LIFO can result in a more balanced CF between non-
firm generators (e.g. generators A and B perform well 
under a LIFO arrangement but suffer under all other 
arrangements as their network access priority is altered).  
Market Arrangements allow control to be handed to the 
generator and reduces generator loss during constraint 
periods (assuming there is a counter party in a local 
curtailment market).  However the transfer of risks and 
the practicalities of implementing market based PoA is a 
disadvantage in the current regulatory framework and 
many changes to technical and commercial codes would 
need to take place. 
 
In the UK, DNOs are moving forwards with non-market 
arrangements. While LIFO is still the most popular 
PoA, trials exist of other arrangements such as UKPN 
FPP network which uses a combination of Pro Rata and 
LIFO arrangements. The learning and experience 
gathered from these trials is continuous. DNOs are still 
a long way from applying market arrangements to their 
networks however with the development and 
introduction of demand side response and storage 
devices the types of PoA used could progress quickly. 
Significant stakeholder engagement is required to 
progress towards the next step of commercial 
arrangements, in addition to new processes and skills 
for the DNO to become a Distribution System Operator. 
 
Further work by the author on the sensitivity of the 
results on the market arrangements is proposed in order 
to further develop market arrangements as a principle of 
access for ANM schemes through a deeper 
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